

Lake Parc Place: A Study of Mixed-Income Housing

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Abstract

Stimulated by Wilson's contentions in *The Truly Disadvantaged* about the deleterious consequences of concentrated poverty, policy makers have considered various ways of creating mixed-income communities. Lake Parc Place is a bold effort to create mixed-income housing in buildings that were formerly a traditional low-income housing project and that are still owned by the Chicago Housing Authority.

Low rents and promises of safety have attracted a sufficient number of "nonproject" residents to fill half the units at Lake Parc Place. This article examines whether these residents feel safe and satisfied, and whether they interact and form friendships with neighbors, get involved in volunteer activities at Lake Parc Place, and support rule enforcement. We present findings from a large survey of Lake Parc Place residents and from in-depth interviews with a subset of the survey sample. We find that Lake Parc Place accomplished the prerequisites for making mixed-income housing into a community.

Keywords: Low-income housing; Development/revitalization; Policy

Stimulated by William Julius Wilson's (1987) contentions about the deleterious consequences of concentrated poverty, policy makers have considered various ways of creating an income mix in housing (Lane 1995; von Hoffman 1996). Residential mobility programs, which help low-income families move to low-poverty areas, are one approach, which is being studied in Chicago's Gautreaux program (Rosenbaum 1995a, 1995b) and in the national Moving to Opportunity program (Hanratty, McLanahan, and Pettit 1997; Katz, Kling, and Liebman 1997; Ladd and Ludwig 1997). Mixed-income housing developments, where various income groups live in the same buildings, are another approach. This article reports a study of such a program.

Lake Parc Place is an effort to create mixed-income housing in buildings that were formerly a traditional low-income housing project and are still owned by the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). Given the reputation of Chicago's housing projects for mismanagement, disrepair, crime, and violence, many initially wondered whether anyone would choose to move to Lake Parc Place. This question was answered when 141 "nonproject" residents arrived, attracted by low rents and promises of security. However, questions remained about whether these residents would feel safe and satisfied enough to stay.

A second question was whether the mixed-income model would work as assumed: Would adding an income mix to public housing lead to benefits for low-income residents and for Lake Parc Place? Lake Parc Place designers hoped that proximity would foster new behaviors and norms. Would the new residents interact with their neighbors? Would they form friendships with other residents? Would they volunteer and get involved in helping improve conditions at the development? Would they provide a clear constituency to support rules of resident conduct, giving implicit or explicit support to management's enforcement? Can a program that moves moderate-income residents onto low-income residents' "turf" create support for new norms of resident conduct that differ from customary behavior in public housing? Is it possible to reverse the problem Wilson described and create a mixed-income community?

The program's designer and chairman of the CHA, Vincent Lane, contended that these positive outcomes would result, and local and national news media carried reports of his contentions. This article examines whether these expectations were borne out. It reports findings from a survey of the residents in Lake Parc Place. The survey, conducted about one year after the first residents moved in (1992), was intended to obtain an overview of residents' satisfaction; support for rules; feelings of safety; and interaction with, and involvement in, their community. In addition, in-depth interviews with a subset of the survey sample, conducted in person at Lake Parc Place, were designed to probe residents' views more extensively in order to elucidate some of the findings of the larger survey. The findings should interest policy makers, analysts, and scholars looking for alternatives to traditional public housing, as well as those seeking ways to combat the problems associated with concentrated poverty.

Introduction

In summer 1991, the first tenants began moving into two renovated 15-story apartment buildings at 39th Street and Lake Parc Boule-

ward in Chicago. Owned by the CHA, the two buildings—together known as Lake Parc Place—represented the CHA’s attempt to create a different kind of public housing. Six years earlier, the 700 families living in these buildings, originally called the Victor Oleaner Homes, and in four other buildings just south along Chicago’s lakefront had been moved out by the CHA. One of many seriously troubled housing projects in Chicago, the six buildings, known as the Lakefront Properties, were slated for complete renovation. The project languished for several years amid controversy as to what should happen to the buildings. During this time the CHA changed hands, and, under the stewardship of its new executive director, Vincent Lane (later chairman of the CHA Board of Commissioners), the idea for Lake Parc Place was generated and implemented.

Lake Parc Place differs from other public housing projects in several key ways. Although owned by the CHA, the new development was managed by two private real estate management companies, RESCORP Realty and Frank Williams Realty, during its first three years. These companies implemented a number of unusual procedures for public housing: They employed an on-site manager who not only maintained an office in the building, but also lived at Lake Parc Place. The CHA has added amenities normally not found in public housing (and sometimes not permitted by regulations), such as miniblinds and ceiling fans. The area around and between the two buildings has been landscaped with grass, trees, playgrounds, and a wading pool. The two buildings also have a full-time janitorial staff; a security desk in the lobby of each building, with 24-hour security guards charged with ensuring that only residents and authorized guests can go past the first floor; a laundry room in each building; and a day-care center and an after-school program. Rules and regulations for residents and their guests, while not much different from those governing other developments, are actually enforced.

The most touted innovation at Lake Parc Place, though, is its mixed-income component. Half of the 282 apartments are designated for, and have been marketed to, families with one employed adult and earning between 50 and 80 percent of median income (between \$21,700 and \$34,700 for a family of four in 1992). To make Lake Parc Place more inviting to such working families, the CHA capped rent levels at \$371, lasting five years from the family’s move-in date, regardless of any rise in the tenant’s income (provided it remained at or below 80 percent of median). Since the late 1960s, residents of public housing have generally paid 30 percent of their income in rent. Though intended to ensure that the very poorest would not be excluded from public housing, this rule has pushed out working families, who found themselves paying more to live in public housing than they would for apartments on the private mar-

ket. The effect has been to accelerate the transformation of public housing from transitional housing for working families to housing of last resort for the poorest families; in so doing, it has exacerbated the social isolation of poor minorities (Hartman 1975; Hays 1985; Lemann 1991; Rainwater 1970).

The other 141 apartments were set aside for very low income tenants—those earning less than 50 percent of the median income. Former residents of the Lakefront Properties had first call on these units. This group included both former leaseholders and dependents of former leaseholders who had lived in the project. Spaces not filled by returning residents were filled by transfers from other CHA housing developments or people on the CHA waiting list. Both returning and new residents must pass through a screening process that involves checks of credit and police records, personal references, recommendations from administrators at the schools children attend, and housekeeping visits.

For simplicity, the terms “project group” and “nonproject group” are used to identify the two groups. These terms do not imply any attribute of individuals or families other than identifying their residence immediately before moving into Lake Parc Place. Indeed, 59 percent of “nonproject” heads of households had lived in public housing earlier in their lives, although not in the year prior to moving to Lake Parc Place, and all had incomes that were below 80 percent of the area median.

Previous research

While the idea of socioeconomic integration’s “uplifting the poor” is not new and has precedents in city and town planning literature both in the United States and abroad (Sarkissian 1976), its present manifestation at Lake Parc Place probably owes its greatest debt to the discussion in recent years of the origins and perpetuation of the urban underclass, particularly the formulation proposed by William Julius Wilson in his 1987 book *The Truly Disadvantaged*. Wilson, one of the most prominent and influential participants in that debate, argued that the exodus of black middle- and working-class families from inner-city neighborhoods that began in the 1960s, as de jure racial segregation wound down, left the poor of those neighborhoods socially isolated. The absence of more economically stable families meant both that the basic institutional structure of strong schools and local businesses in ghetto areas could not be sustained during the long periods of joblessness in the 1970s and 1980s and that these areas lacked the “mainstream role models that help keep alive the perception that education is meaningful, that steady employment is a viable alternative to welfare, and that family stability

is the norm, not the exception” (Wilson 1987, 56). The poor of these neighborhoods, according to Wilson, are thereby cut off as well from the resources and information that would connect them to job and educational opportunities.

While others have recently disputed the idea that the poor in the black community are any more isolated now than in the past and have placed more emphasis than Wilson does on the continuing role played by white racism (e.g., Farley 1991; Katz 1993; Massey and Denton 1993; Petersen 1991), Wilson’s argument that concentration effects result when disadvantaged people have only disadvantaged neighbors has received research support (Brooks-Gunn et al. 1997a, 1997b; Jencks and Mayer 1990). In a longitudinal study of young men, Datcher (1982), using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in 1968 and 1978, found that “at least one quarter of the gap in education and earnings of Black men due to background differences can be accounted for by variations in neighborhood quality” (p. 41). Hogan and Kitagawa (1985), in a study of pregnancy rates in unmarried black teenagers, found that rates were significantly higher for those living in ghetto neighborhoods, though the significance disappeared when the extent of parental supervision of dating was controlled. Crane (1991), using “percentage of high-status workers in the neighborhood” as a measure of neighborhood quality, found that the dropout rates of black students increased dramatically as the percentage of high-status workers fell below 5.6 percent: “the effect of living in the very worst neighborhoods is more than fifty times greater than the effect in the middle” (p. 306). He observed similar effects in his analyses of teenage childbearing. In both cases, the effect was most significant in the largest cities. Of course, these studies could not separate the effects of neighbors from other characteristics of the low-income areas, nor could they eliminate the possibility of self-selection in who chose to live in these areas (Jencks and Mayer 1990).

In a recent comprehensive review of research, Turner and Ellen (1997) conclude that most studies find a positive relationship between neighborhood characteristics and labor market success in terms of employment rates and earnings (Case and Katz 1991; Datcher 1982; Massey, Gross, and Eggers 1991; O’Regan and Quigley 1996). They also conclude that most studies “find that having more affluent neighbors is associated with higher IQ at ages 3 and 5, after controlling for family attributes” (citing Brooks-Gunn et al. 1993, 1997a, 1997b; Duncan 1994), presumably because of “better day care centers, pre-schools, and playgrounds and greater adult supervision and monitoring” (Turner and Ellen 1997, 9). They also note that “virtually all of the existing empirical research points to some relationship between neighborhood environment and sexual

activity or pregnancy among adolescents” (citing Brooks-Gunn et al. 1993; Crane 1991; Hogan and Kitagawa 1985; Ku, Sonenstein, and Pleck 1993; Mayer 1991). Other studies indicate that violence is strongly associated with the low socioeconomic status of neighborhoods (Short 1997; Skogan and Maxfield 1981). Sampson et al. (1997) find that normative disapproval of deviant behavior is less common in areas of concentrated poverty and argue that this reduced normative disapproval explains the increased violence and homicides in these areas.

In a quasi-experimental study of the Gautreaux program, in which low-income black families (who were residents, or on the wait list, of the CHA) were randomly assigned to city or suburban areas, Rosenbaum and Popkin (1991) found that those who moved to suburbs were much more likely to be employed, although their earnings and hours worked per week were no different than those of city movers (perhaps because their human capital was unchanged). Compared with city movers, suburb-mover children were more likely to graduate from high school, attend college, attend four-year colleges, and, if they did not attend college, were more likely to be employed and to have jobs with better pay and better benefits than city movers (Rosenbaum 1995a, 1995b). Surprisingly little difference was found in social integration: The city and suburban groups reported the same level of interaction with and support from neighbors for both mothers and children (Rosenbaum et al. 1991; Rosenbaum 1995a, 1995b). The findings suggest that low-income blacks may experience considerable benefits in moving to middle-class white communities and few or no social costs.

More recently, a national program, Moving to Opportunity (MTO), run by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and modeled after the Gautreaux program, has randomly assigned low-income families to three groups: an MTO group that must move to low-poverty areas, a Section 8 group that can move anywhere (but tended to move to high-poverty areas), and a control group that is not given Section 8 certificates (and tended not to move). The early results of this program suggest some gains in employment and earnings in Los Angeles (Hanratty, McLanahan, and Pettit 1997) but not in Boston, although the authors suggest that two years may not be sufficient time to gauge this outcome (Katz, Kling, and Liebman 1997). The Boston MTO children were less likely to bully other children, to be unhappy, to be disobedient at school, or to have asthma attacks, all of which are thought to be reactions to anxiety (which is consistent with the finding that the MTO children were less likely to have seen someone carrying a gun or knife than the control children). The MTO mothers were less likely to have had a major depressive episode during the past 12 months than the control group mothers (Katz, Kling, and Liebman

1997). Because the authors cite extensive literature showing the impact of maternal mental health on quality of parenting and child outcomes, these results are also likely to have implications for children. The Los Angeles and Boston MTO studies found no significant declines in social interactions or friendships.

This growing body of literature suggests that neighborhoods with low concentrations of poverty positively affect residents' chances for success. However, the mechanisms by which these concentration effects are transmitted have not yet been clearly identified; thus, it is not clear what it is about socioeconomically heterogeneous communities that permits better outcomes (Rosenbaum and Miller 1997, forthcoming). What matters, and what matters most? Is it characteristics of the higher-status individuals themselves—as role models, sources of information, or political participants? Or is it characteristics of the neighborhoods: their more abundant resources and services or higher-quality physical condition and location? What is the influence of racial and ethnic demographics? Though difficult to answer, such questions are crucial to policy interventions.

An even larger issue is whether mixed-income communities can be created anew. If mixed income is desirable, can such heterogeneity be created in existing ghetto communities? Wilson and others (e.g., Anderson 1990) lament, to a certain degree, the passing of the vertically stratified pre-Civil Rights era black community. Can such communities, which evolved over decades, be quickly restored by policy actions? Aside from questions of feasibility, we also need to ask whether the result would be the same in the 1990s if similarly organized communities were somehow assembled. While some of the studies cited above examine individuals living in existing heterogeneous neighborhoods, the diversity of these communities is presumably organic, not engineered by policy makers.

Two kinds of mixed-income policies have been attempted: integrating neighborhoods and integrating housing developments. Many of the planned towns that sprang up as part of the New Communities movement of the 1960s attempted to integrate both economically and racially, either from an ideological commitment to “social balance” or because they sought and received government funding that mandated the inclusion of project units (Burby and Weiss 1976; Smookler 1976). Studies of these communities, however, noted that towns that included some form of low-rent or subsidized housing were macro-, not microintegrated; the units were clustered by block or in a separate subcommunity and were the minority of all units (Smookler 1976). More recently, the court-ordered Yonkers (New York) program built seven small public housing complexes (14 to 48 units) in middle-income neighborhoods (Briggs 1998). Such pro-

grams provide low-income residents with superior schools and proximity to other resources, but Briggs's early results raise concerns about barriers to these resources and to interaction with more affluent neighbors.

Others have tried to integrate housing developments, with varying degrees of success. The Massachusetts Housing Finance Authority financed 16 mixed-income developments and conducted a "social audit" of its efforts in 1974 (Ryan et al. 1974). Some attempt was made in these developments to integrate racially as well as economically, with less success; two-thirds of the minority families lived in only six of the developments, the six that the authors of the study note most resembled traditional subsidized, nonintegrated housing, with no market-rate tenants at all. Residents of the most integrated developments tended to be the most satisfied, but largely, the authors stress, because mixed-income developments tended to have higher-quality construction and design features, as well as superior management and location; the principal determinants of tenant satisfaction in all developments were found to be variables related to these physical aspects of the development. The mixed developments were designed primarily for a moderate-income group, with some units set aside as subsidized, and were of a much higher quality. The study did not measure the impact of the mix on residents beyond their satisfaction.

Mixed-income approaches have attracted increased interest in the 1990s. The HOPE VI program aims to redevelop distressed public housing as mixed-income communities, and special standards for Federal Housing Administration insurance remove barriers to financing mixed-income housing. Analyzing a new national database, Khadduri and Martin (1997) found 1,136 housing developments that are de facto mixed-income, whether or not they were explicitly developed with that aim, and the researchers analyze the contexts in which they occur. Khadduri and Martin define mixed-income as housing that gives "poor children an opportunity to live close to working families with incomes above the poverty level" (p. 34). This definition seems to assume that the programs' impact will be on children, suggesting that analyses of effects may take a generation and may possibly work differently if market-rate households are childless.

Brophy and Smith (1997) studied seven successful mixed-income housing developments: Harbor Point (Boston), Tent City (Boston), Jones Family Apartments (San Francisco), Emery Bay Club and Apartments (Oakland, CA), Timberlawn Crescent (Montgomery County, MD), Ninth Square (New Haven, CT), and New Quality Hill (Kansas City, MO). In contrast to the preceding study, the au-

thors define mixed-income housing as a “deliberate effort” at income mixing (Brophy and Smith 1997, 5). They note that some mixed-income developments have succeeded in drawing higher-income groups but have not succeeded in making these groups involved. In particular, Harbor Point, Ninth Square, and Tent City (which have respectively attracted 26 percent, 28 percent, and 37 percent of residents above 80 percent of median income) seem to have minimal interacting and neighboring among these residents and the subsidized group; in the case of Harbor Point, tension exists between income groups, and there is “a fair amount of vandalism to vehicles” (p. 8).

Tent City raises the question of whether having “two populations living side-by-side with little interaction” with “market rate renters seldom participat[ing] in activities related to the building” (Brophy and Smith 1997, 15) satisfies the minimum prerequisite for mixed-income housing. Two-thirds of the market-rate units at Tent City are occupied by graduate students living together and paying up to \$2,100 per month in rent. In Ninth Square, few market-rate residents attend building activities, and, although many children live in subsidized units, only one child resides in a market-rate unit. Moreover, Harbor Point raises a question about the definition of “mixed-income”: It has inadvertently created “a de facto concentration of low-income renters” (p. 9) in separate buildings (which house the three- and four-bedroom units), because few market-rate households have children, and those few have only one preschool child.

While many of these projects aim to create role modeling, employment, and “life chances” benefits for the low-income residents, these are highly ambitious aims, which may depend on other conditions’ being met (Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 1997). Brophy and Smith (1997, 6) suggest that such benefits require, as a prerequisite, interaction among income groups, and the authors’ observations suggest that the prerequisite interaction may prove problematic. In addition, the vandalism of the higher-income group’s cars by the low-income teenagers at Harbor Point raises further questions about the extent of rule enforcement. Brophy and Smith indicate that “perhaps the biggest challenge is income integration in neighborhood settings where property management is not able to set behavioral norms” (p. 3). In addition, in the case of “housing in blighted inner-city areas, the question is whether an environment created within the development can compensate for the shortcomings of the surrounding community” (p. 6). Because the preconditions underlying the success of mixed-income programs are likely to be easier to study and are of fundamental importance, Schwartz and Tajbakhsh (1997) argue that research should focus on these preconditions. That is the aim of this study.

Some of the questions left unanswered by the literature may be addressed by Lake Parc Place. In housing mobility programs such as Gautreaux and MTO, socioeconomic heterogeneity has been achieved by moving low-income households onto the “turf” of higher-income groups, which drastically alters the neighborhood’s crime rate, job opportunities, social services, and schools. This is not the case at Lake Parc Place. Here, an attempt is being made to bring working families back into an area and a type of housing from which most had fled. Little has changed for the low-income residents of Lake Parc Place. While the development itself has been renovated, it is still in the same place: The Oakwood Community area in which Lake Parc Place is located was, according to the 1990 census, Chicago’s poorest, with a poverty rate of 72.3 percent, the highest rate of households receiving public assistance (58.8 percent), and the highest rate of unemployment (18.7 percent) (London and Punttenney 1993). The CHA has plans to turn a portion of Oakwood into mixed-income new communities (known as the MINCs project), with market-rate town houses and new project housing as well (required because 141 units of very low income housing were eliminated from the Lakefront Properties).

The changes at Lake Parc Place, however, do not alter the economic picture of Chicago or the job market for low-skilled or unskilled workers: They do not affect the number of good jobs that have moved to the suburbs. They do not pour more money into the public schools. They do not change patterns of racial segregation (no special attempt was made to integrate Lake Parc Place racially, and it remains, like the surrounding neighborhood, entirely black), nor do they alter employers’ hiring practices (Kirschenbaum and Neckerman 1991; Rosenbaum and Binder 1997). While Schwartz and Tajbakhsh (1997, 76) are correct in describing this area as “potentially desirable,” the emphasis should be on the word “potentially.” In 1992, this area was one of the poorest in the city, lacking jobs, construction, or small retail shops. Oakwood’s location—a few miles from downtown Chicago and next to Lake Michigan—gave it “potential,” but even with all the publicity about the grand dreams for the area, there was no rush to build in Oakwood, which had many blocks of vacant land filled with rubble and weeds.

What this litany indicates is that the changes at Lake Parc Place—the introduction of working residents, improved management, better rule enforcement, screening procedures, and modest improvements in amenities—are limited and identifiable. Given that the preponderance of structural factors has not changed, these innovations may not be enough to stem the poverty, joblessness, poor education, and violence and vandalism that characterize public housing in Chicago and the nation.

Implementation

The story of Lake Parc Place begins with Vincent Lane, who took Wilson's ideas, informed them with his own experience as a developer, and energetically pushed against a multitude of obstacles to have them implemented. In the process of studying Lake Parc Place, we came to see the pivotal role played by Vincent Lane, who was characterized by his staff as a remarkable thinker and leader.

Vincent Lane has many detractors, perhaps with good reason. He left the CHA in 1995 amid controversy ("HUD Tired of CHA Failures" 1995). But on a salary of \$1 per year, he devoted 12-hour days for many years to improving the safety, living conditions, and hopes of CHA residents, in an agency that had poorly served its constituency for many decades. He pushed for reforms in spite of political pressure, bureaucratic inertia, lawsuits, and death threats; he met with hostile residents in open forums to discuss his reforms, and he met with hostile, predominantly white suburbanites to push for scattered-site housing. He carried out many improvements, and creating Lake Parc Place was one of his priorities.

Lane inspired the staff who worked on Lake Parc Place. CHA personnel who had previously been resigned to bureaucratic inaction were stimulated by his leadership. In 1993, a member of our research team interviewed 12 CHA staff members who had worked on the design and implementation of Lake Parc Place. They reported that Lane inspired them to make Lake Parc Place successful. Said one, "I think we all got swept up when Vince came. . . . We all got swept up in . . . his program agenda and how seriously he took things, wanting to make them change." Another noted how Lane created enthusiasm where there had been apathy: "He came with the idea . . . 'It's gonna take time, but it's gonna change.' So [my] enthusiasm . . . I owe it to him. . . . We see that there's a chance."

Lane began his reforms of the CHA by focusing on Lake Parc Place. A staff member reported an attitude prevailing in other units of the CHA of "it's good enough for government work"—the customary excuse for shoddy work and inaction. But the staff working on Lake Parc Place was motivated by enthusiasm and a commitment to quality. The effort to add amenities to Lake Parc Place was a constant battle against federal regulations, and one administrator reported that these frustrating battles were a major portion of his job. One regulation barred wading pools for children, even though "without the splash pools, the kids would open the fire hydrants." After Lane's lengthy battle to obtain exemption from the National Housing Act to make mixed-income housing possible, his staff had to seek HUD approval for every single amenity they wanted for Lake Parc Place. For example, one staff member reported that pur-

chasing a ceiling fan—a \$25 item—entailed burdensome appeals of field-office disapprovals. “Every step of the way we had to stop and Vince had to take an issue to Washington.”

While these HUD procedures frustrated the Lake Parc Place administrators, Lane inspired his staff to keep pushing. In a 1993 interview, an administrator reported, “I used to ask him in the hallways because we were always burdened down with this HUD stuff . . . ‘Vince, how long do we have to handle this? They’re killing us with all of these restrictions.’ And he said, ‘Well, it’s all going to change in two years.’ And he’s not too far off.”

Vincent Lane’s plans for Lake Parc Place were idealistic. Many saw him as visionary. Lane was impressed by William Julius Wilson’s ideas, and he often spoke of them to professionals, residents, and citizens’ groups and in radio and television interviews. He believed that mixed-income housing could create positive role models, change values, and raise expectations about what was possible in public housing. Low-income families could see that peaceful living conditions were possible, compliance with rules could be desirable, and self-sufficiency was attainable. He argued that bringing in moderate-income residents would create demand for services and economic development inside Lake Parc Place and that the children of moderate-income residents would interact with the children of low-income families, influencing the succeeding generation.

Many people, including members of our research group, were skeptical that these ideas could succeed. But our findings have allayed many of our doubts. It is not our purpose to assess Lane’s tenure, but our discussions with his staff suggest that they believe that Lane left the CHA a much better place than it had been when he arrived—an agency with a clear mission and clear ideas about how to achieve it, which took some policy steps in the right direction. He did not finish the job, and he failed at some important goals, but Lane’s staff felt he had begun to lead the CHA away from the dispiriting conditions that had pervaded the agency for many decades.

Drawing on his own experience and the judgment of other real estate developers, Lane made several key decisions about how Lake Parc Place should be implemented. First, he chose a location that had potential for improvement. Although the Lake Parc Place neighborhood is a high-poverty area and is bordered to the west by low-income housing developments, Lane could see that it had potential, as Schwartz and Tajbakhsh (1997) have noted. It is adjacent to the lakefront (to the east) and lies between the downtown Chicago Loop to the north and, to the south, the Hyde Park district, which houses a stable middle-class community and the University of

Chicago. While the Lake Parc Place neighborhood was widely perceived as “undesirable,” its immediate surroundings on three sides offered considerable attractions and possibilities for improving the neighborhood’s economy.

Second, Lane insisted on an explicit effort to mix incomes on every floor of the buildings. Although 46 percent of the project group were employed, they could not substantially affect the group’s income mix because their annual earnings averaged under \$5,000; the non-project group had an average annual household income of \$22,000 (table 1). Besides bringing in a new income group, Lake Parc Place mixed income groups within buildings and on every floor, unlike Harbor Point, where low-income families lived in buildings separate from the higher-income childless couples. As a matter of policy, borne out by most reports and by our own observations, every floor at Lake Parc Place had an income mix.

Third, Lane chose an income mix that might have been conducive to the goal of interaction. While some other mixed-income develop-

Table 1. Background Variables

	Nonproject (Standard Deviation)	Project (Standard Deviation)	Significance (<i>t</i> -Score)
Household income (mean)	\$21,879 (11,511)	\$4,930 (4,545)	- 11.83***
Hourly wage (mean)	\$9.69 (3.47)	\$6.02 (2.53)	- 6.59***
Hours worked per week	38.6 (9.2)	32.0 (11.4)	- 3.36***
Age (mean)	36.0 (11.6)	35.2 (14.8)	- 0.46 (no significance)
Years of education	13.2 (1.3)	11.5 (1.9)	- 7.34***
Number of children	1.7 (1.4)	2.6 (1.9)	3.82***
Average age of children (mean)	11.8 (10.1)	10.0 (9.7)	- 0.94 (no significance)
% with children 5 years and under	32.2	46.4	chi-square: 2.68 (d.f. = 1)*
% employed in year before moving	82.8	45.9	chi-square: 28.09 (d.f. = 1)***

ments have attracted proportionately large numbers of market-rate residents, these residents have often been single individuals or households without children, who may not interact with, or have much in common with, the development's low-income residential families (for example, Tent City, Ninth Square, and Harbor Point [Brophy and Smith 1997]).¹ Nearly all of Lake Parc Place's moderate-income residents had children, and many had lived in public housing in the past; these conditions may have been more conducive to their involvement and interaction with lower-income neighbors than would have been the case for higher-income families who had previously been isolated from the poor. It is also noteworthy that all families were black, which may have facilitated interaction. These families were recruited through open houses, contacts with area employers, and advertisements in city newspapers (the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Chicago Defender*, and *La Raza*; the latter two serve the black and Hispanic communities, respectively).

Fourth, Lane placed high priority on strong building management and visible 24-hour security. The first building manager at Lake Parc Place was a black woman, experienced at building management, who lived on-site seven days a week. She was bright and articulate, able to explain the goals and demands of mixed-income housing to residents, visitors, and the media. Good management is expensive, but Lane believed it to be a crucial investment that pays for itself. In 1993, while two comparable public housing units (Horner Homes and Wells) incurred \$30,000 in rent collection losses, the losses at Lake Parc Place totaled \$2,360. In addition, each building at Lake Parc Place had a security desk with 24-hour coverage, charged with ensuring that only residents and guests they authorized could go past the first floor.

Fifth, Lane consulted developers in deciding which amenities were needed to draw moderate-income residents. Lane decided on several features normally not in public housing: landscaping and playgrounds, closet doors, wooden kitchen cabinets, miniblinds, laundry facilities, ceiling fans, and windows that could accommodate air conditioners. Lane's staff struggled to obtain approval for several of these amenities; some are now standard throughout public housing. The development's brochures now describe "Lake Parc Apartments" as a "beautiful community" that includes many amenities such as

¹ Brophy and Smith (1997) note the value of having the moderate-income tier to bridge the gap between the low-income and market-rate renters at Tent City. However, they do not explain what they mean by bridging the gap, and their account indicates that the market-rate groups at both Tent City and Ninth Square had "minimal interaction and neighboring" and little involvement in housing activities (p. 16). The lack of involvement by students and childless households is not surprising. While the moderate-income group did not seem to cause the market-rate group to become involved, the former may have been involved themselves.

“newly remodeled kitchens and bathrooms, miniblinds, [and] ceiling fans with . . . light fixtures in the dining area and paths along the lake for walking, running, bicycling and even fishing off the rocks.”

Finally, Lane devised a program for helping moderate-income people build their savings. A portion of their rent was placed in an escrow account, which they would receive when they left Lake Parc Place. Moderate-income families were required to leave after five years, and they could use this account for a down payment on a home, for their children’s education, or for other purposes. Given that moderate-income families often chose Lake Parc Place as a way to save money, this feature may have had additional appeal. Lane believed this was a way for Lake Parc Place to help make a lasting impact in improving their lives.

Implementation of mixed-income housing requires constant vigilance. While the CHA required moderate-income residents to leave within five years, it was committed to replacing them. After Vincent Lane left the CHA in 1995, Lake Parc Place management seemed to lose sight of the program’s goals and filled all vacancies with low-income families. They may have done so out of expediency. The moderate-income waiting list had thousands of names when Lake Parc Place was inaugurated; however, moderate-income applicants on waiting lists tend to find other housing, and it takes effort on management’s part to advertise for every opening. Meanwhile, low-income applicants, who have few housing options, remain a ready market. Management allowed the income mix to become highly skewed (down to 33 percent moderate income). When an outside observer pointed out this fact, the CHA expressed displeasure and immediately directed Lake Parc Place management to alter its practice; and since 1997, the proportion of moderate-income residents has begun to rise, with the goal of returning to a 50-50 balance.

Prerequisites for success

A one-year follow-up study is too early to judge success, but it can assess to what extent Lake Parc Place has met the prerequisites for the success of mixed-income housing. For Lake Parc Place to attract and retain moderate-income residents and improve the lives of low-income residents, some preconditions had to be met. While official statistics and observations suggest that some administrative preconditions were met, some social prerequisites can be assessed only by studying residents. These questions provide the focus of our study of residents.

In the context of the many problems in public housing, particularly in Chicago, low rents alone are unlikely to be sufficient to attract

and retain residents. The vacancy rate at CHA's Cabrini Extension is 32 percent, and "the development is considered so undesirable that the turndown rate is close to 100 percent . . . there is almost no waiting list for units" (Fischer 1995, 6). The mere availability of low-cost housing may not be sufficient incentive to relocate even for low-income residents; and this holds even more for moderate-income residents, who have alternatives.

The CHA clearly succeeded in inducing moderate-income families to move into Lake Parc Place. When Lake Parc Place opened, there was a waiting list of several thousand moderate-income families, and everyone who was accepted moved in. To encourage nonproject residents to remain at Lake Parc Place, however, the CHA needed to make it well managed, well maintained, and safe.

The CHA argued that the private sector could manage the Lake Parc Place buildings better than the CHA itself. But, given the state of Chicago's public housing, it was not certain that CHA housing could be well maintained or that decay and destruction of property at other public housing could be curtailed. Our observations suggest that the development has achieved considerable success in these areas. In more than 50 visits to Lake Parc Place, our research team saw few indications of graffiti, property destruction, or crime, in marked contrast to other public housing in Chicago. CHA statistics indicate that Lake Parc Place incurred minimal costs for vandalism repairs, while such costs exceeded \$10,000 annually at more than half of the city's public housing developments.

Nor was it certain that CHA buildings could be made safe. Random gunfire, attacks on residents, and gang activity have remained prevalent in many other CHA buildings, even after major efforts to introduce security procedures, deploy security equipment, and increase the numbers of guards (Popkin et al. 1993). Lake Parc Place's manager reported that the development averaged five fights per week during the summer of the first year; by the summer of the second year, it had only five fights all summer. Chicago Police Department statistics indicate that the crime rate was much lower at Lake Parc Place than at other public housing in Chicago (table 2). Our observations support these statistics.

The key issue, however, is residents' views. In particular, after nonproject residents arrived, would they see Lake Parc Place as a safe place to live? Would they be satisfied? The mixed-income model assumed that nonproject individuals would not merely reside at Lake Parc Place but interact with neighbors, make friends, get involved, and support the rules of resident conduct. How successfully did Lake Parc Place realize these goals?

Table 2. Violent Crime in High-Rise CHA Developments

Development	Crimes per 100 Residents
Dearborn	11
Hilliard	12
Horner	11
Ickes	13
Lake Parc	3
Madden	11
Rockwell	12
Stateway	11
Taylor	13
Washington	9
Wells	12

Source: Chicago Police Department.

The study

The survey began in the spring of 1992 and finished later in the year—about one year after the development opened—with a total of 198 interviews completed. We decided to survey only adult female householders, because there were too few men in the project group to constitute a large enough sample. A total of 282 apartments in the two 15-story buildings, subtracting 12 households without a woman present and 10 vacancies, yielded a potential universe of 260 families, of which we obtained usable responses from 198 (76 percent).² Of the 198 families surveyed, 118 were in the nonproject group, and the remaining 80 were in the project group. As expected, the two groups were quite different in income, education, and num-

² Approximately half of the interviews were conducted over the telephone, and the rest in person or through the mail (for which a slightly shorter survey instrument was used). Multiple methods of reaching residents proved necessary, as many did not have telephones or were difficult to find at home when we called. After several attempts had been made to reach all residents by telephone, in-person interviews were conducted. The mailed surveys were subsequently sent to all those we had not reached by phone or in person and accounted for the smallest number of respondents reached. We had only two refusals over the phone, but it is impossible to say how many refusals we had in person: Interviewers could not always tell, for instance, whether a door was not being opened because no one (or no adult) was home, or because the resident did not want to participate in the study.

ber of children (table 1). It is not clear what accounts for the differing response rates between the two groups.

We also conducted semistructured interviews with 20 female adult residents of Lake Parc Place during the summer of 1993, 10 from the project group and 10 from the nonproject group. The survey was intended to get an overview of residents' satisfaction, interaction, involvement, and feelings of safety. The longer in-person interviews were designed to probe more informally residents' views of the buildings, their neighbors, and their lives at Lake Parc Place in order to elucidate some of the quantitative findings of the larger study.

Residents' feelings of safety

Given the violence prevalent in other public housing in Chicago, we felt great concern about how residents would view the safety of Lake Parc Place. The survey asked two general questions about safety: "How safe do you feel being out alone in your neighborhood at night?" and "How safe do you feel in the elevators or stairways in your building at night?" The five-point scale ranged from 1, "very safe," and 2, "safe," through 4, "unsafe," and 5, "very unsafe," with 3 as the noncommittal, "middle" category.

During their first year, both groups felt safe inside the building (table 3). While the project group felt slightly safer than the nonproject group, even the nonproject group felt safe (1.75 = between "safe" and "very safe"). In the neighborhood, the project group again felt safer than the nonproject group, but here the difference was larger. While both groups were on the "safe" end of the scale, the nonproject group answered 2.90, practically in the middle, while the project group answered 2.13, close to the "safe" category. At a time when local news media carried daily stories of assaults and murders in housing projects, the vast majority of residents felt safe in Lake Parc Place, and less so in the surrounding neighborhood.

We can get a better understanding of residents' views of their safety by looking at their perceptions of how safe they felt prior to their move. While both groups saw the elevators and stairs at Lake Parc Place as safe (less than 2 on the scale), the residents from the projects rated the elevators and stairs in their previous residences as close to the unsafe category (3.86), and the nonproject residents rated their premove building as less than safe (2.41, difference significant). While the move to Lake Parc Place led to the greatest gain in safety for project residents, Lake Parc Place also represented a clear improvement in building safety for many nonproject residents.

Table 3. Attitudes and Behaviors

	Nonproject (Standard Deviation) (<i>n</i> = 118)	Project (Standard Deviation) (<i>n</i> = 80)	Significance (<i>t</i> -Score)
Lake Parc Place safe	1.75 (0.93)	1.47 (0.75)	2.38*
Area safe	2.90 (1.42)	2.13 (1.16)	4.16*
Previous apartment safe	2.41 (1.43)	3.86 (1.45)	6.24**
Previous area safe	2.94 (1.62)	3.88 (1.55)	4.06**
Rules enforced	3.77 (1.23)	4.18 (1.03)	2.40*
Management safety efforts	3.87 (1.12)	4.20 (0.99)	2.15*
Management repairs	3.73 (1.23)	4.06 (1.08)	1.95
Satisfaction overall	3.89 (1.12)	4.34 (0.89)	3.14**
Watching children	1.21	1.48	0.73
Having a meal	1.11	1.17	0.71
Talking 10 minutes	3.42	3.67	0.80
Lending items	1.46	1.71	0.70
Greeting	4.69	4.69	0.02
Phone	1.02 (1.59)	1.27 (1.85)	0.77
Volunteer at Lake Parc Place	0.52 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.27
Volunteer hours/week	9.12 (8.58)	7.65 (11.71)	0.49
Any Lake Parc Place friends	0.50 (0.50)	0.58 (0.49)	0.91

* $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$. *** $p < 0.001$.

Prior to their move, the project group rated their neighborhoods close to the unsafe category (3.88). The nonproject group rated their premove neighborhoods as somewhat less safe than their building—close to neutral (2.94)—and no safer than the Lake Parc Place neighborhood. (As expected, the project group considered their premove neighborhoods significantly less safe than did the nonproject group.) While Lake Parc Place represents a clear improvement in neighborhood safety for many project residents, it represents no change for nonproject residents.

That there is such a difference between the levels of safety experienced by the respondents within their buildings and outside is both a plus and a minus for Lake Parc Place. It is, on the one hand, encouraging that residents generally feel as safe as they do inside the development, given their greater insecurity in the surrounding area; even the nonproject group, who tend to feel unsafe in the neighborhood, feel safe inside Lake Parc Place. On the other hand, the results suggest that Lake Parc Place remains an “island” of safety for a number of residents, particularly those in the nonproject group. This contrast also highlights the fact that part of the living environment at Lake Parc Place clearly lies beyond the control of either management or the CHA, regardless of how well they run the development itself.

It might be added that despite a neighborhood context that is probably socially and economically weaker than Boston’s Commonwealth development, Lake Parc Place’s residents felt as safe as Commonwealth residents did. Vale (1996) reports that 80 percent of Commonwealth’s residents felt “very safe” in their development during the day; the figure is much higher if one includes “safe” as well. We find that 94 percent of the project residents report feeling safe or very safe in Lake Parc Place. Of the nonproject residents (who are not comparable to Commonwealth residents), 84 percent feel safe or very safe. While feelings of safety are a slippery gauge for comparison, these results suggest that Lake Parc Place may have achieved a resident perception of security as good as Boston’s successful Commonwealth development.

Social interaction, friendships, participation, and support of rules

Like any experimental program, Lake Parc Place raises a number of questions about people’s behavior. Would nonproject residents interact with other residents or participate in Lake Parc Place activities? Although the residents chose to live there, questions remained about how involved they would be in the life of the development. Would they interact with their neighbors, or would they minimize their interactions at Lake Parc Place? Would they form friendships with other residents of the development? Would they volunteer and get involved in helping improve conditions at Lake Parc Place? Would they provide a clear constituency to support rules of resident conduct, giving implicit or explicit support to management’s enforcement?

Interaction. The program assumed that residents would interact. This assumption is not necessarily true. In most urban high-rise

apartment buildings, interaction is not frequent or even expected. This might be even more true for the nonproject people in Lake Parc Place; because their contract limits their residence to five years, they might reasonably see their time at the development as limited and choose not to get involved. Moreover, if they moved to Lake Parc Place solely for the low rent, they may have little interest in interacting with neighbors. In addition, because nonproject people are more likely to be employed, they may have less time to interact at home, and they may have friends at work. In short, there are a number of reasons to expect that nonproject people might not interact with neighbors at all, or they might interact less than project residents.

The survey asked residents how often they interact with others in a number of types of activities—watching neighbors' children, having a meal, spending more than 10 minutes talking, loaning things, letting a neighbor use their phone, greeting a neighbor in the street or hallway. Not surprisingly, the Lake Parc Place residents perform some activities more than others. Greeting a neighbor is done often, with an average over 4.69, on a scale where 5 is almost every day and 4 is about once a week. In contrast, "having a meal with a neighbor" is relatively rare, 1.17 or less, where 1 is once a year and 2 is a few times a year (0 is "never").

Very few individuals had no interactions. Only two respondents reported that they never greet neighbors, and only four more said they greet neighbors less than once a week. Both project and nonproject groups were equally likely to report greeting their neighbors—4.69 for both groups. Spending more than 10 minutes talking with a neighbor was fairly common: more than once a month, but less than once a week. The project group was somewhat more likely to talk than the nonproject group—3.67 for the project group and 3.42 for the nonproject group—but the difference is not significant.

More complex interactions, such as eating a meal with a neighbor, occur about once a year on average for both groups. Similarly, watching a neighbor's children is relatively rare, between once and a few times a year. Lending items to neighbors is somewhat more common in both groups, but still less than several times a year on average.

The most striking finding is that none of these categories of responses reveals significant differences between groups. While the project group is slightly more likely to engage in many of these activities than the nonproject group, the difference is never large or significant. Contrary to concerns that nonproject people might not interact with neighbors at all, or that they might interact less than

project residents, the results indicate similar amounts of interaction by the two groups.

The in-depth interviews with 20 residents asked the respondents to identify with whom they interacted. Some nonproject residents reported that they interacted with project residents; some interacted often, and some even created employment opportunities for other project residents—as babysitters, day-care assistants, or beauticians. Because questions about interaction across income groups created discomfort and some ambiguity in pilot testing, our large survey did not ask respondents to identify those with whom they interacted, or who their friends were, to avoid stimulating antagonisms (and hurting response rates). While the survey can report how often respondents interacted with their Lake Parc Place neighbors, it cannot report with whom they interacted. However, the in-depth interviews indicate that some nonproject people do interact with project people. In sum, the concern that the nonproject group would isolate themselves from their Lake Parc Place neighbors is not supported.

Friendships. Respondents were asked how many friends they had in Lake Parc Place and how many outside Lake Parc Place. The percentage who have any friends at Lake Parc Place is greater for the project group than the nonproject group (58.5 percent versus 50.0 percent). We find similar patterns for number of friends and for percentage of friends at Lake Parc Place (dividing the number of Lake Parc Place friends by the total number of friends). Project residents have more Lake Parc Place friends than do nonproject residents (4.2 versus 2.0); the percentage of friends living at Lake Parc Place is also higher for project residents than it is for nonproject residents (24.7 percent versus 11.0 percent).

The nonproject residents have fewer friendships at Lake Parc Place on all measures. These differences are not surprising given that many in the project group had formerly lived in these buildings. In sum, while observers can see a 50 percent rate as half full or half empty, the concern that most nonproject residents would have no friends at Lake Parc Place is not supported.

Volunteering. We next examined resident involvement at Lake Parc Place. Management tried to get residents involved in volunteer activities to improve Lake Parc Place. The manager tried to convince all residents that they had a vested interest in helping make living conditions safe and pleasant. She encouraged residents to volunteer in supervising playground activities, child-care activities, and children's field trips. She also asked for help with administrative duties. While the nonproject group were more likely to be employed

and thus less likely to have time for volunteer activities, they might see such activities as important.

Half the respondents (50 percent) reported some involvement in volunteer activities. While the nonproject group is slightly more likely to volunteer than the project group (52 percent versus 49 percent), a substantial proportion of both groups volunteer. The number of volunteering hours shows the same pattern: nonproject people volunteer slightly more hours than do project residents (9.12 versus 7.65 hours per week). Thus, substantial numbers of both groups are volunteering, and on this level, the nonproject group is slightly more involved, although the difference is not statistically significant. Again we find that many nonproject residents are involved at Lake Parc Place. In addition, reports in the interviews suggested that volunteering activities often provided opportunities for the two groups to interact.

Support of rules. At other developments rule enforcement was lax—security guards often feared to intercede in gang-related disputes, and management did not enforce rules governing noise, littering, yelling, fighting, showing identification to security guards, or rent paying, out of either indifference or fear. Although it had the same rules as other CHA developments, Lake Parc Place management took the rules seriously and enforced them.

In addition to the criteria noted above, income mixing might influence the quality of life at Lake Parc Place if nonproject residents provide a clear constituency to support rules of resident conduct, giving implicit or explicit support to management's enforcement. This assumption will be valid if the nonproject group is more strongly supportive of Lake Parc Place rules than the project group.

The survey provides some support for this assumption. The nonproject group is less likely to say that Lake Parc Place has too many rules or that management is too strict. While only 5.4 percent of the nonproject group feel that Lake Parc Place has too many rules, 26.8 percent of the project group do (significant $p < 0.01$). And while only 3.6 percent of nonproject group feel management is too strict, 12.5 percent of the project group do (not significant). The nonproject group provides a near-unanimous constituency in support of management's rules. This argument for mixed-income housing is clearly supported.

The results also raise an interesting question about how much support is needed to convey a perception of rules' legitimacy. Strict management may not be sufficient to deter violations of hard-to-monitor rules (e.g., rules on noise, littering, supervising children). Strong normative consensus may be needed to enforce such rules.

How high a percentage is needed to indicate a “consensus”? While over 70 percent of the project group support management’s rules and enforcement, this still leaves room for a substantial dissenting minority that may undermine cooperation. If the project group were the sole residents of Lake Parc Place, a potential violator would know that many would not disapprove a violation, and the manager’s claims of a normative consensus would be seen as exaggerated. But the presence of nonproject residents creates a clear constituency for these rules. Their 95 percent support for rules represents a highly visible constituency that might make a potential violator more reluctant to break management’s rules. Because nonproject residents are dispersed throughout the buildings, a violation would be noticed anywhere at Lake Parc Place. In the interviews, many residents noted that neighbors were quick to complain about rule infractions. Residents who agreed with rules found it reassuring that order would be maintained. Residents who disagreed with rules said that their behavior was influenced by a concern that infractions would be detected, informally disapproved, reported to management, and probably punished.

The nonproject group also provides a clearly visible constituency to support rule enforcement. Thus, while management might have had difficulty demonstrating a mandate from the project group, the nonproject group’s unambiguous support may be easier to use as a practical rationale.

The findings summarized above support many of the premises of the mixed-income model. We found indications that nonproject residents interacted with the project group, that nonproject residents got involved in improving public housing, and that nonproject residents provided a clear constituency to support rules. In sum, most of the nonproject residents interact and get involved with their community and provide strong support for rules and enforcement.

Residents’ satisfaction

Ultimately, the preservation of mixed-income housing at Lake Parc Place depends on whether nonproject residents remain satisfied enough to stay. The survey asked residents about how satisfied they are with management’s rule enforcement, management’s safety efforts, and the speed of management’s building repairs (table 4), on a five-point scale ranging from 1, “very dissatisfied,” to 5, “very satisfied.”

Both groups of residents tend to be satisfied on each item (the mean is about 4, “satisfied”). Project residents are more satisfied than nonproject residents on each item (rules enforcement: 4.18 versus

Table 4. Resident Satisfaction with Lake Parc Place, by Premove Satisfaction

Premove	Nonproject Residents Satisfaction Postmove					Total
	Very Dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Middle	Satisfied	Very Satisfied	
Very dissatisfied	1	0	1	9	4	15
Dissatisfied	0	2	2	4	7	15
Middle	2	1	1	7	8	19
Satisfied	0	3	4	22	12	41
Very satisfied	3	4	6	7	8	28
Column total	6	10	14	49	39	118
Percentage	5.1	8.5	11.9	41.5	33.1	100.0

Premove	Project Residents Satisfaction Postmove					Total
	Very Dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Middle	Satisfied	Very Satisfied	
Very dissatisfied	0	0	1	12	23	36
Dissatisfied	0	0	1	7	8	16
Middle	0	0	1	1	3	5
Satisfied	0	2	1	6	7	16
Very satisfied	2	0	0	4	0	6
Column total	2	2	4	30	41	79
Percentage	2.5	2.5	5.1	38.0	51.9	100.0

3.77; safety efforts: 4.20 versus 3.87; repairs: 4.06 versus 3.73. While the first two comparisons are significant and the last is nearly significant, it is noteworthy that even the nonproject averages uniformly exceed 3.7, closer to “satisfied” than to neutral.

Residents were also asked to rate their overall satisfaction on the same five-point scale: “Considering everything, how satisfied are you with Lake Parc Place?” Overall, the project group is signifi-

cantly more satisfied than the nonproject group (4.34 versus 3.89), but even the latter tend to be closer to satisfied than to neutral. Most residents in both groups are satisfied with Lake Parc Place.

The change in satisfaction can be most clearly seen by looking at tables that compare satisfaction before and after moving to Lake Parc Place. Most residents who were satisfied prior to their move remain satisfied after coming to Lake Parc Place—both project (77 percent) and nonproject (71 percent) residents (table 4). However, the most significant change characterizes those who were dissatisfied before coming to Lake Parc Place: Of the many project residents who were dissatisfied before moving, nearly all (96 percent) are satisfied after moving. Of the nonproject residents who were dissatisfied before moving, the vast majority (80 percent) are satisfied after moving. At the end of the first year, relatively few individuals are less satisfied with Lake Parc Place than they had been with their prior home, and most are more satisfied.

Regression analyses allow us to discover what factors explain resident satisfaction. Various background characteristics, such as respondent's age, income, employment status, and number of children, do not explain who is satisfied (table 5). In contrast, residents' perceptions of management's enforcement of rules, safety efforts, and the speed of building repairs are significant predictors of satisfaction (table 6), even though these variables show substantial variation (see table 3).

Examining nonproject and project groups separately, however, we find that each has a different set of significant explanatory variables. For the nonproject group, four factors (perceptions of management's ability to enforce rules, safety in the surrounding neighborhood, management's safety efforts, and the speed of repairs) explain as much as 40 percent of the variation in satisfaction. For the project group, only two factors (perceptions of building safety and speed of repairs) are significant, explaining about 22 percent of the variation in satisfaction; rule enforcement and neighborhood safety, however, have little influence (table 6).

Thus, while management's rule enforcement and safety efforts do not influence the satisfaction of project residents, these factors significantly influence the satisfaction of nonproject residents. The nonproject residents provide a strong constituency for enforcement and safety efforts, which project residents might not have demanded as strongly. These results indicate that the vast majority of people in both groups are satisfied. However, somewhat different factors influence the satisfaction of the two groups.

Table 5. “Previous Conditions” Model of Satisfaction (Standardized Regression Coefficients)

<u>All Groups</u>								
Step #	Income	Years of Education	Age	No. of Children	Children ≤ 5 ^a	Relocatee ^b	Employed ^c	Adj. R ²
1	-0.18*	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.03
2	-0.15	0.02	-0.09	-0.03	0.22	0.08	-0.04	0.01

<u>Project</u>								
Step #	Income	Years of Education	Age	No. of Children	Children ≤ 5 ^a	Relocatee ^b	Employed ^c	Adj. R ²
1	0.25*	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.05qc
2	0.23*	-0.19*	—	—	—	—	—	0.08
3	0.24	-0.21*	0.05	-0.04	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.03

<u>Nonproject</u>								
Step #	Income	Years of Education	Age	No. of Children	Children ≤ 5 ^a	Relocatee ^b	Employed ^c	Adj. R ²
1	-0.04	-0.03	-0.09	-0.13	-0.10	0.08	-0.08	0.05

Note: — = variable not included in this model.
^aDummy variable: 1 = had children 5 or younger.
^bDummy variable: 1 = lived in the development before renovations.
^cDummy variable: 1 = employed in year before moving to Lake Parc Place.
 **p* < 0.05.

Conclusions and policy implications

This study has limitations. While the survey demonstrates that both groups socialize with their neighbors, it does not indicate how much project and nonproject residents interact with each other. This one-year study could not even hope to examine to what extent mixed-income housing promotes greater economic self-sufficiency among the lower-income residents or to what extent interaction is instrumental in this process. Nonetheless, as one of the first surveys in recent years of the residents in a mixed-income development, this study presents an overview of residents’ satisfaction, interaction, involvement, support of rules, and feelings of safety.

Official statistics and our own observations indicate that Lake Parc Place has succeeded in its administrative goals—creating a mixed-

Table 6. Attitude-Based Model of Satisfaction (Standardized Regression Coefficients)

<u>All Groups</u>							
Step #	Rules Enforced ^a	Building Safety ^b	Repairs ^a	Area Safety ^b	Management Safety Efforts Better ^a	Neighbors Friendly ^c	Adj. R ²
1	0.45****	—	—	—	—	—	0.20
2	0.36****	-0.29****	—	—	—	—	0.27
3	0.26***	-0.27****	0.21***	—	—	—	0.30
4	0.25***	-0.22***	0.21***	-0.11	—	—	0.30
5	0.18**	-0.22***	0.18**	-0.12	0.13	—	0.31
6	0.18*	-0.21***	0.18**	-0.10	0.13	-0.05	0.30

<u>Project</u>							
Step #	Rules Enforced ^a	Building Safety ^b	Repairs ^a	Area Safety ^b	Management Safety Efforts Better ^a	Neighbors Friendly ^c	Adj. R ²
1	-0.41****	—	—	—	—	—	0.16
2	-0.33****	0.27***	—	—	—	—	0.22
3	-0.30***	0.18*	0.16	—	—	—	0.23
4	-0.30***	0.16	0.13	0.07	—	—	0.22
5	-0.28***	0.17	0.12	0.07	-0.08	—	0.22
6	-0.28**	0.17	0.12	0.07	-0.07	-0.02	0.21

<u>Nonproject</u>							
Step #	Rules Enforced ^a	Building Safety ^b	Repairs ^a	Area Safety ^b	Management Safety Efforts Better ^a	Neighbors Friendly ^c	Adj. R ²
1	0.55****	—	—	—	—	—	0.29
2	0.49****	-0.26**	—	—	—	—	0.34
3	0.33**	-0.28***	0.26**	—	—	—	0.38
4	0.27**	-0.23**	0.23*	0.19*	—	—	0.40
5	0.26*	-0.17	0.23*	0.20*	-0.14	—	0.40
6	0.25*	-0.16	0.24*	0.20	-0.13	-0.06	0.39

Note: — = variable not included in this model.
 * $p < 0.1$. ** $p < 0.05$. *** $p < 0.01$. **** $p < 0.001$.
^aScale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
^bScale: 1 (very safe) to 5 (very unsafe).
^cScale: 1 (very friendly) to 5 (very unfriendly).

income population and making buildings physically attractive, well managed, well maintained, and safe. If these were the only goals of mixed-income housing, then Lake Parc Place would be a complete success.

Lake Parc Place also sought to fulfill additional goals that are more complex and harder to assess by observation. This study provides evidence of how successfully these goals were met. We find that Lake Parc Place was successful in persuading nonproject people to move into public housing in a high-poverty neighborhood and in getting both project and nonproject residents to feel safe and satisfied, to interact with neighbors, to form friendships with neighbors, to support the building's rules and norms, and to volunteer in activities that maintain order and help the community and children.

As indicated in another article in this issue (Miller 1998), residents see the rules as part of a Hobbesian bargain, necessary to preserve order and safety and to keep neighborhood disorder and violence outside the walls of Lake Parc Place. They see rules as a matter of survival—to keep the development from reverting to the chaotic state of other housing projects. Some critics have doubted the value of mixed-income housing because it furnishes housing to non-needy people at some public subsidy—units that could have gone to the very poor. There are several points to consider in addressing this criticism.

We lack data to determine the amount of public subsidy that nonproject residents receive, but the premise that Lake Parc Place's nonproject residents are "not needy" is probably false. They are not very far from the project group in their level of need. By definition, they are below median—between 50 and 80 percent of median—and most of their employment situations offer no job security. In addition, their personal histories are not much different from those in the project group; 59 percent of the nonproject group have lived in public housing at one time in their lives. Thus, the nonproject people Lake Parc Place is helping still need help. In an era of declining wages for low-skilled workers, Lake Parc Place provides additional support for this group. In the early decades of public housing, these people would have been residents, so this new reform is reinstating old practices.

Moreover, helping moderate-income residents is relevant to the aim of helping low-income residents. One of the most important tasks of public policy is to provide low-income people with incentives to work. While some believe that this can be done by punitive measures, positive incentives are more humane and probably more effective. The working poor are the most visible examples of society's incentives for employment. If the working poor lose housing assis-

tance by taking jobs, low-income people will see incentives to avoid employment. Lake Parc Place shows this cohort that working allows their nonproject neighbors to build savings, which would be difficult without Lake Parc Place's low rent, and the development also establishes an escrow savings account for them. When Lake Parc Place's low-income residents see that nonproject families are accumulating savings to buy a home or to fund their children's education, they can see the incentives for trying to get jobs.

While it is hard for this one-year study to show that nonproject people affect their low-income neighbors, we find that nonproject people are an asset for Lake Parc Place in some of the ways that Lane's vision suggested. Unlike the market-rate students and childless couples in Boston's Tent City and Harbor Point, moderate-income nonproject residents interact and get involved in Lake Parc Place. According to the 20 interview respondents, some interacted with project neighbors, in casual interaction in hallways and playgrounds, and in volunteer activities. Some even created employment opportunities for other residents as babysitters and beauticians. They also used the day-care services at Lake Parc Place, which employed some project residents as assistants. In a small way, these relationships created a degree of economic development inside Lake Parc Place, as Lane had hoped. The children of nonproject residents interacted with the children of project families, suggesting the possibility of influences on the next generation. Inevitably, Lake Parc Place fell short of the visionary ideal conjured up in Lane's speeches, but, as social researchers trained to be skeptical of public relations claims, we were surprised to see some of the elements of Lane's vision come to reality, at least in small ways.

The most common arguments for mixed-income housing are that low-income residents see moderate-income residents as positive role models (and learn from them) and that they will be more likely to get jobs. Our research was unsuccessful in testing either of these contentions.³ They remain significant unanswered questions for further research.

³ The Lake Parc Place model assumed that project residents' employment rates would increase because they would see their nonproject neighbors as role models: They would be more motivated to take jobs, they would see how nonproject people combined work with family responsibilities, and perhaps they would get leads on jobs. In the first in-depth interviews, we tried to ask people if they saw other residents as role models. The idea was familiar to them; they had heard it often enough. However, the project people found this idea rather insulting, implying that they were childlike, inferior, or needing improvement. We did not obtain answers to the question in our open-ended interviews, and the negative reactions we received dissuaded us from even asking about role modeling in the survey. Some project residents may have observed and emulated nonproject residents, but they were not

Perhaps the clearest potential impact of the nonproject group is their near-unanimous support for Lake Parc Place rules. While tenant selection and strict rule enforcement can improve compliance with rules, as Vale (1996) has shown for Boston's Commonwealth development, it is not clear that these procedures are sufficient to achieve that end. Indeed, Vale notes that "many respondents wished that the management company could have more leeway in screening out undesirable new tenants" (p. 521). The CHA has anticipated that extensive tenant selection procedures would ensure support for rules, but 30 percent of project residents did not support the development's rules. Apparently, selection procedures that the CHA thought were rigorous, and that some critics thought were too severe, were not completely effective in selecting project residents who would support rules.

Even if strict rule enforcement is effective, rule violations and crime often happen in places not easily seen by management or security staff, such as elevators and stairwells (Newman 1972). Therefore, management must learn about infractions from tenants, who are sometimes afraid to report them. In most public housing in Chicago, only one-third of residents report infractions (Popkin et al. 1996).

In contrast, having nonproject residents may contribute to security. Nearly all nonproject residents at Lake Parc Place strongly support the rules and insist on enforcement (rule enforcement is the most important factor in determining their satisfaction). A person considering violating a rule may realize that there is a 30 percent chance that a project observer will not care, but a 95 percent chance that a nonproject observer will care a lot. Because nonproject residents are scattered all over Lake Parc Place, it is a near certainty that violations will be reported. Therefore, the knowledge that nonproject residents unanimously support rules and are located throughout Lake Parc Place probably discourages crime and vandalism. This fact may explain why Lake Parc Place has achieved feelings of security among its residents comparable to Boston's successful Commonwealth development.

The mixed-income design also helps low-income residents see that rules are customary, usual, and needed. Lake Parc Place enforced

going to admit it to researchers.

An effort to perform a follow-up survey two years later achieved a response rate of only 40 percent, despite persistent efforts. This survey found a decrease in employment (from 61.7 percent prior to moving to Lake Parc Place to 51.7 percent after moving), a smaller decrease in full-time employment (from 48.2 percent to 40.2 percent), and an increase in work hours for those with jobs. However, because we cannot assume that our sample was representative, we believe these findings should be ignored.

many rules that are not customarily enforced in CHA buildings but are usually enforced in private apartment buildings (e.g., rules against littering, yelling out windows, noise in the hallways). It would have been difficult to convince project residents of the legitimacy of these rules if Lake Parc Place were not mixed income, because CHA residents were not accustomed to these rules and did not realize they were normal in many private apartment buildings. Indeed, some project residents often complained that the rules were unfair. However, seeing nonproject residents accept and abide by these rules helped project residents realize that rules are customary in private apartments.

The safety of Lake Parc Place should not be taken for granted. The CHA has made extensive efforts to deter crime, violence, and vandalism at other buildings, but these efforts have been largely unsuccessful, because residents rarely reported crimes they saw because they feared retaliation and doubted the ability of the police to protect them (Popkin et al. 1996). The gangs reasserted their dominance; at the Horner development, they expelled the guards from the building whenever they wanted. Since 1988, the CHA has drastically increased its security budget, staff, and procedures at Cabrini Green, yet the number of serious crimes has increased steadily, from 502 in 1988 to 717 in 1992 (Fischer 1995). While the rate has declined since then, the 43 percent increase over four years suggests that increasing security efforts does not guarantee reduction in serious crimes.

The one development in which the CHA has clearly reduced crime is Lake Parc Place. Thus, while it is possible that public housing could reduce crime without income mixing, mixed-income housing may be a cushion against inevitable imperfections in selection procedures and enforcement, discouraging rule breaking even though 30 percent of project residents do not support rules and may not report violations. Regardless of whether residents or outsiders are the agents of misbehavior, our model assumes that deterrence requires residents' support. While good management can limit crime, management cannot do it alone. Unambiguous support of rules and enforcement by residents deter all parties (resident or outsider) from misbehavior.

Policy makers might assume that good management and tenant screening are sufficient to ensure tenant support of rules. Such strategies might work to prevent littering, but not to stem illegal drug activity, which is a significant problem in public housing. Some public housing residents are ambivalent about drug enforcement and are reluctant to report gang activity, especially if they know the offenders (Popkin et al. 1996). Even at Boston's exemplary Commonwealth development, "nearly two-thirds of respondents

described drugs as a ‘major problem’ ” (Vale 1996, 520), and many felt that tenant screening was too weak (Vale 1996). Bringing in nonproject residents who unambivalently support rule enforcement provides strong additional support to good management.

Of course, income mixing provides no guarantees. Even after four years of operation, many residents of Lake Parc Place still worried that one or two incidents might push the development down the slippery slope toward conditions in other housing projects. Nonetheless, given the predominance of crime, violence, and vandalism at other CHA buildings, Lake Parc Place’s success is a remarkable achievement.

Obviously, bringing nonproject residents to Lake Parc Place has had costs. Some physical amenities were not expensive (showerheads, closet doors, ceiling fans); others, such as wood cabinets, were more substantial. Better management and better security were not just amenities; they returned economic benefits in the form of improved rent collection and reduced vandalism. More speculatively, if landscaping ultimately helps the economic development of the area, then it would constitute an investment, not merely an amenity. The CHA’s financial records were in serious disarray at the time of our study, so we could not estimate the costs of the amenities. However, given typical reports of housing authorities, spending \$50,000 to \$80,000 per unit in renovations at the customary spartan level, we suspect that less than a 5 percent increment would facilitate provision of many of the Lake Parc Place amenities, some of which might offer tangible returns.

Among the costs of income mixing is the provision of housing for displaced families. Some plans make poor provision for displaced families, sometimes proposing simply to hand them Section 8 certificates and force large numbers to fend for themselves on short notice. Given the current tight housing market, this approach is likely to create extensive homelessness. More careful planning is needed to provide housing to all displaced families.

Lake Parc Place has satisfied the requisite preconditions for further successes. If Lake Parc Place had not managed to instill order, if nonproject people had not interacted with neighbors or not volunteered to help each other, or if they had not provided strong support for rules, then advocates would have to rethink the rationale for mixed-income housing. Lake Parc Place has accomplished these intermediate goals, although assessing longer-term goals (e.g., improving project residents’ self-sufficiency) will require research with a longer time frame. At a time when policy analysts are seeking ways to increase the “social capital” available to residents of public housing (Bothwell, Gindroz, and Lang 1998; Lang and Hornburg

1998; Putnam 1993; Saegert and Winkel 1998), the present results suggest that mixed-income housing, by providing connections to neighbors who can provide information, resources, and constructive social norms, clearly has promise.

Income mixing should be considered a valuable tool in the repertoire of policy makers. While researchers are not likely to sort out the relative influences of good management versus income mixing anytime soon, policy makers must act today. Such action argues for sensible strategic thinking. In some cases, good management and tenant screening may be enough, but income mixing may be a useful element in a program to improve public housing, especially in turning around a bad situation or in a high-profile first effort where success is essential to further efforts. Income mixing in public housing may improve the chances for success.

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The authors are grateful for the work of many individuals. They are particularly indebted to Angela Irvine, Shazia Miller, and especially to Nancy Fishman. Support for this work was provided by the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern University. The opinions expressed here are solely those of the authors.

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